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Abstract
Invasive alien species (IAS) constitute a major threat to global biological diversity. In 
order to control their spread, a detailed understanding of the factors influencing their 
distribution is essential. Although international trade is regarded as a major force 
structuring spatial patterns of IAS, the role of other social factors remains unclear. 
Despite studies highlighting the importance of strong governance in slowing drivers of 
biodiversity loss such as logging, deforestation, and agricultural intensification, no 
study has yet analyzed its contribution to the issue of IAS. Using estimates of govern-
ance quality and comprehensive spatiotemporal IAS data, we performed multiple lin-
ear regressions to investigate the effect of governance quality upon the distribution of 
species listed under “100 of the worst” IAS in 38 Eurasian countries as defined by 
DASIE. Our model suggested that for countries with higher GDP, stronger governance 
was associated with a greater number of the worst IAS; in contrast, for the lowest GDP 
countries under analysis, stronger governance was associated with fewer of these IAS. 
We elucidate how the quality of governance within a country has implications for 
trade, tourism, transport, legislation, and economic development, all of which influ-
ence the spread of IAS. While our findings support the common assumption that 
strengthening governance benefits conservation interventions in countries of smaller 
economy, we find that this effect is not universal. Stronger governance alone cannot 
adequately address the problem of IAS, and targeted action is required in relatively 
high- GDP countries in order to stem the influx of IAS associated with high volumes of 
trade.
K E Y W O R D S
corruption, DAISIE, environmental governance, human movement, propagule pressure, tourism, 
trade, travel, worldwide governance indicators
1  | INTRODUCTION
Effective prevention and control of invasive alien species (IAS) re-
quire a thorough understanding of the determinants of invasion. 
The socioeconomic context of biological invasions is thought to 
be well understood, with previous studies highlighting the role of 
international trade (Westphal, Browne, MacKinnon, & Noble, 2008) 
and globalization (Amano, Coverdale, & Peh, 2016; Meyerson & 
Mooney, 2007). One socioeconomic factor of biological invasions, 
however, has not yet been addressed in this context. Despite 
an emerging literature examining the role of governance in is-
sues such as biodiversity loss (Smith, Muir, Walpole, Balmford, & 
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Leader- Williams, 2003), illegal logging (Smith, Obidzinski, Subarudi, 
& Suramenggala, 2003), agricultural intensification (Ceddia, 
Bardsley, Gomez- y- Paloma, & Sedlacek, 2014), and deforestation 
(Umemiya, Rametsteiner, & Kraxner, 2010), there is a paucity of 
studies considering its role during the process of biological invasion 
(Lotz & Allen, 2013).
Governance is defined as, “the traditions and institutions by 
which authority in a country is exercised” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2011). Biodiversity conservation is intimately related 
to multiple aspects of governance. For example, corruption has 
been correlated with changes in forest cover, numbers of African 
elephants, and numbers of black rhinoceroses, illustrating that 
strong governance is essential to slowing the rate of biodiversity 
loss (Smith, Muir, et al., 2003). Similarly, illegal logging in Indonesia 
increased during political transitions, when governments are weak 
and have underdeveloped institutions, and thus more vulnerable 
to corruption (Smith, Obidzinski, et al., 2003). In support of this, 
worsening corruption correlated with poorer environmental perfor-
mance across 66 tropical developing countries worldwide (Peh & 
Drori, 2010), and increases in deforestation rates have been found 
to associate with decreases in the quality of governance (Umemiya 
et al., 2010).
Besides control of corruption, there are other aspects of gover-
nance, such as Political Stability, Voice and Accountability, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, and Rule of Law (Kaufmann et al., 
2011). There has been little focus to date on what role these aspects 
of governance play in the distribution of IAS. Only one previous study 
has briefly explored the impact of governance upon invasive species 
(Lotz & Allen, 2013), finding some evidence of a relationship between 
Political Stability (as defined and estimated by Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2009) and the prevalence of invasive birds and mammals 
in 100 countries worldwide. But in other environmental studies, po-
litical instability, in combination corruption, has been found to reduce 
the stringency of environmental regulations (Fredriksson & Svensson, 
2003). Likewise, stronger democracy—through its protection of free 
speech and its capacity to hold leaders accountable—has been shown 
to reduce aquatic pollution, deforestation, and land degradation (Li 
& Reuveny, 2006), whilst increasing protected land area (Midlarsky, 
1998).
Whether stronger governance plays a beneficial role concerning 
IAS remains unknown. In this study, we used cross- country estimates 
on the quality of governance in conjunction with comprehensive 
Eurasian IAS data to explore the role of governance in structuring the 
distribution of the 100 “worst”’ (i.e., most severe) IAS for 38 Eurasian 
countries, as defined by DASIE. Increased trade and economic de-
velopment have been shown to correlate with more heavily invaded 
countries (Pyšek et al., 2010; Westphal et al., 2008). We hypothesized 
that stronger governance—through its ability to foster a society which 
enforces environmental laws and can effectively monitor and regulate 
IAS—acts to mitigate the effect of trade on introducing damaging IAS 
between economically developed countries. In contrast, economically 
equivalent countries with comparatively poorer governance would 
suffer relatively more invasions.
2  | METHODS
2.1 | Governance data
Indicators for six dimensions of governance were taken from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators Project (WGI). These six ag-
gregate indicators are weighted averages of data collated from 
hundreds of individual variables measuring governance worldwide 
(Kaufmann et al., 2011), making them a comprehensive measure of 
governance. The six indicators are (adapted from Kaufmann et al., 
2011) as follows:
1. Voice and Accountability—freedom of expression and the extent 
to which citizens participate in government matters.
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence—the likelihood of politi-
cal instability and terrorism.
3. Government Effectiveness—the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation.
4. Regulatory Quality—the quality of private sector regulation.
5. Rule of Law—the extent to which people trust and abide by the 
rules of society, including the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts.
6. Control of Corruption—the extent to which public power is exer-
cised for private gain.
The concept of “invasion debt”—in which current patterns of 
IAS richness are better described by historical rather than mod-
ern socioeconomic data (Essl et al., 2011)—suggests that con-
temporary indicators are unsuitable for this analysis because 
they fail to reflect governance at the time of an introduction. We 
therefore first explored whether the relative rank of countries’ 
governance changed over time. While WGI only began in 1996, 
changes in WGI estimates from 2000 to 2009 are small world-
wide (Kaufmann et al., 2011), and from 1998 to 2008, just 29% 
of countries under our analysis showed significant changes in a 
single aggregate indicator (Kaufmann et al., 2009), indicating that 
governance estimates are surprisingly static over short times-
cales. As evidence, WGI estimates from 1996 were compared to 
2012 estimates using Spearman’s rank correlation tests. For all 
six WGI indicators, 1996 estimates strongly correlated with those 
in 2012 (Figure 1), confirming that governance data are relatively 
stable over time.
To support this assumption across longer timescales and through-
out major changes in the Eurasian political landscape, we confirmed this 
result using an older, alternative governance index: the International 
Country Risk Guide. Data for the ICRG’s Political Risk Ratings (PRS 
Group) are available since 1984. The ICRG is the earliest, publicly avail-
able governance indicator, representing an upper limit on the histor-
ical availability of governance estimates (Kaufmann et al., 2009). For 
each country, earliest available annual mean ratings were compared to 
mean scores from 2012 using Spearman’s correlations; former nations 
were compared against modern counterparts (e.g., Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic were matched against Czechoslovakia). Scores from 
1984 to 1986 were significantly correlated with ratings from 2013 
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(rs = .697, n = 31, p < .001), reinforcing the description of governance 
estimates as time- invariant. This assumption of time invariance in gov-
ernance has similarly been justified in a previous study of governance 
and biodiversity (Ceddia et al., 2014), further increasing our confi-
dence in this instance.
Numerous studies within the governance- biodiversity literature 
have analyzed individual WGI indicators, and it is clear that there are 
benefits of having insight into how individual aspects of governance 
interrelate with biodiversity (Ceddia et al., 2014; Eklund, Arponen, 
Visconti, & Cabeza, 2011; Lotz & Allen, 2013). As such, we analyzed 
F IGURE  1 Governance estimates from 1996 to 2012 in six aggregate indicators (a–f) were examined using Spearman’s rank correlation tests 
(rs). In all six indicators, estimates from 1996 were correlated with estimates from 2012. (a) Corruption: rs = .931. (b) Rule of Law: rs = .947. (c) 
Political Stability: rs = .875. (d) Government Effectiveness: rs = .940. (e) Regulatory Quality: rs = .908. (f) Voice and Accountability: rs = .932. In all 
correlations, n = 38, p < .001
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individual WGI indicators separately, as well as an overall score for 
governance. As in a previous study (Umemiya et al., 2010), an overall 
governance score (from 0 [low] to 30 [high]) was calculated by sum-
ming mean scores during the period 1996–2012 for all six indicators, 
and setting these values relative to zero. Lower scores correspond to 
relatively weaker governance; higher scores correspond to relative 
stronger governance.
2.2 | Alien species data
Invasive alien species introduced into Eurasia prior to 1952 were ex-
cluded from the analysis. The earliest international treaty targeting IAS 
in Eurasia was the 1951 International Plant Protection Convention, in 
force since 1952 (Genovesi & Shine, 2003). Although governance con-
stitutes more than legislation, the existence of legislation and com-
pliance to it encompasses numerous aspects of governance including 
Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, Control of Corruption, and 
Regulatory Quality. The existence of legislation is therefore a good 
indicator that intentional governance mechanisms were in existence in 
relation to IAS. The international treaty is a good cross- country indica-
tor of the intention to govern as it establishes that in 1952 Eurasian 
nations were aware of IAS and had policy in place to target IAS. 
Therefore, any new introductions post- 1952 have the potential to be 
influenced by governance. Introductions prior to 1952 were therefore 
excluded from the study, since these would have occurred outside 
a timeframe in which it would be guaranteed that governance could 
have had any intentional effect.
We are aware that including all species that have been recorded 
since 1952 undoubtedly means that some species recorded arrived 
before the convention was in place, due to the lag between arriving 
and recording of invasive species (Jeschke & Strayer, 2005; Kowarik, 
1995). Nevertheless, as the lag time is both highly variable and unpre-
dictable (Jeschke & Strayer, 2005; Kowarik, 1995), we felt this was the 
best strategy for capturing all the species introduced after the conven-
tion came into force.
Data on IAS were collated from the DAISIE European Invasive 
Alien Species Gateway (http://www.europe-aliens.org). Although the 
most comprehensive IAS database for Eurasia (including non- European 
countries such as Russia, Israel, and Turkey), country- specific informa-
tion on the timing of introductions for most species is either poor or 
absent. It was therefore not possible to analyze governance in relation 
to total IAS richness per country. However, DAISIE provides exten-
sive information, including known arrival dates for each country, for 
a subset of IAS identified by DAISIE as being “100 of the worst” IAS 
in Eurasia in terms of their severely negative impact on biodiversity, 
economy, and public health. This dataset (hereinafter “DAISIE 100”) 
informs about the distribution of the 100 worst IAS in Eurasia.
The DAISIE 100 represents species from a broad suite of taxa and 
habitats, including 18 terrestrial plants, 16 terrestrial invertebrates, 15 
terrestrial vertebrates, 16 inland water species, three terrestrial fungi, 
and 32 species from coastal waters, thereby representing all main tax-
onomic groups and all environments (Vilà et al., 2009). DAISIE 100 
species pose significantly severe threats to biodiversity: 71% are 
recorded to have reduced native biodiversity or altered the invaded 
community, and 19% have threatened endangered species (Vilà et al., 
2009). Therefore, despite the absence of country- specific information 
on their impacts, the DAISIE 100 is a suitable proxy for the invasive 
richness in a country, especially since the number of 100 worst spe-
cies per country correlates with total IAS richness (rs = .730, p < .001, 
n = 38). As not all countries have coastal areas, marine species are a 
potential source of bias and were therefore excluded from the anal-
ysis, leaving 68 species. For each country, a DAISIE 100 score was 
calculated by counting the number of species on the “100 worst” list 
introduced from 1952 onwards, excluding marine species. Higher 
scores indicate countries have more invasions.
2.3 | Explanatory variables
Thirteen explanatory variables, including governance, were consid-
ered to account for factors known to influence the distribution of IAS. 
(Hayes & Barry, 2008), and thus, their inclusion in the model was war-
ranted. One explanatory variable was governance, both as an overall 
governance score and as six separate indicators.
Of the 12 remaining explanatory variables, three captured climatic 
factors, since climate matching between native and introduced ranges 
is important in determining the distribution of invasive mammals 
(Forsyth, Duncan, Bomford, & Moore, 2004); reptiles and amphibians 
(Bomford et al. 2009); fish (Bomford et al. 2010); plants, insects, shell-
fish, and finfish. A further four variables captured economic factors, 
because economic activity is well studied as a driver of the prolifera-
tion of exotic species (Taylor & Irwin, 2004). The final five explanatory 
variables captured natural and human geographies which also shape 
the dynamics of IAS.
These 12 explanatory variables, and the justification for their in-
clusion, are listed here:
1. Area (km2, Central Intelligence Agency 2014) is a strong predictor 
of IAS richness per country (McGeoch et al., 2010).
2. Continentality (difference in mean January and June temperature, 
°C; Mitchell, Carter, Jones, Hulme, & New, 2004) was expected to 
correlate negatively with the worst IAS: lower annual variability in 
temperature might give IAS a stronger likelihood of finding the cli-
mate favorable for establishment.
3. Mean annual precipitation (mm; Mitchell et al., 2004) and
4. Mean annual temperature (°C; Mitchell et al., 2004) has been previ-
ously found to determine IAS richness (Lambdon et al., 2008).
5. Insularity (island = 1; mainland = 0) affects the distribution of IAS, 
since islands are typically more heavily invaded than mainland 
(Simberloff, 1995).
6. Human Population (The World Bank, 2013) and
7. Human Population Density (people/km2 of land area, The World 
Bank, 2013) are known to account for IAS richness across countries 
(McKinney, 2006; Pyšek et al., 2010) and were therefore included 
in our model.
8. Road Density (km road/100 km2 of land area, The World Bank, 
2013) facilitates the dispersal of IAS (Hulme 2009. For example, the 
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extent of terrestrial transport networks accounted for the density 
of alien plants in European and North African countries (Vilà & 
Pujadas, 2001), justifying its inclusion in the analysis.
9. GDP (US$, The World Bank, 2013) positively associates with the 
number of invasive plants, birds, fish, and mammals in Europe 
(Hulme, 2007).
10. GDP per capita (US, The World Bank, 2013) has accounted for the 
global spread of invasive birds, and mammals (Lotz & Allen, 2013).
11. Merchandise Imports (US$, The World Bank, 2013) has been previ-
ously used in IAS studies to capture the extent of a country’s par-
ticipation in international trade (Westphal et al., 2008). Trade has 
been shown to account for global patterns in IAS (Westphal et al., 
2008).
12. The KOF Index of Globalisation reflects the economic, political, and 
social dimensions of globalization for a country (Dreher, 2006). 
Globalization is argued to be accelerating the rate of biological inva-
sion worldwide and thus merits inclusion in our analysis (Meyerson 
& Mooney, 2007).
Direct measures of ecosystem disturbance, which are known to facil-
itate the establishment of IAS (Lozon & MacIsaac, 1997), have not been 
included. Although percentage agricultural land has been previously 
used as a measure of habitat disturbance (Lotz & Allen, 2013), only a 
small proportion of species used to calculate DAISIE 100 scores were 
found in agricultural habitats (29%), making it unsuitable to use here. 
Furthermore, GDP has been previously used as a proxy for disturbance 
(Westphal et al., 2008), suggesting it will be accounted for in our models 
indirectly.
2.4 | Statistical analysis
Before constructing the global model, explanatory variables in the multi-
ple linear regressions were examined for collinearity with Pearson’s tests 
(Table S1). The less- informative parameter of strongly correlated vari-
ables (r > .7 or < −.7) was eliminated. GDP correlated with Merchandise 
Imports (r = .951, p < .001) and Human Population (r = .925, p < .001); 
as these were also correlated with each other (r = .846, p < .001), both 
were excluded from the analysis. As Merchandise Imports is an indica-
tion of trade, which is known to dictate the spread of IAS, a reanaly-
sis of the model using Merchandise Imports instead of GDP was still 
performed to verify the findings. Governance correlated with GDP per 
capita (r = .903, p < .001) and Globalisation (r = .766, p < .001); these 
two variables were therefore removed.
Response variables in regressions were DAISIE 100 scores. Area, 
Human Population Density, and Road Density were log- transformed 
and centered to zero mean to satisfy regression assumptions. An in-
teraction term (GDP × Governance) was also included in this global 
model after GDP and Governance were centered to zero mean. 
Diagnostic plots confirmed that assumptions of linear regression were 
not violated.
Models for all possible parameter subsets were compared in 
terms of parsimony and prediction on the basis of Akaike Information 
Criterion (Akaike, 1973) using the function “dredge” within the pack-
age MuMIn (Bartoń, 2014) in R (R Core Team 2014). AICc was used 
since n/K < 40 (Johnson & Omland, 2004). The difference in the AICc 
values between the top model and other models was calculated (∆i). 
Models were ranked in order of increasing ∆i. Models with ∆i < 6 were 
considered the “best” set of models (Symonds & Moussalli, 2011).
For graphical analysis, countries were categorized by GDP ac-
cording to Ward’s minimum variance method in R, which maximized 
the Euclidean distance between each cluster. This process separated 
countries into categories based on natural breaks in the data, creating 
robust, internally consistent categories, and reducing the likelihood of 
results arising due to poor discretization.
The absence of spatial autocorrelation in our model was deter-
mined using the R package ncf (Bjornstad, 2013). Moran’s I was cal-
culated at 250- km intervals from the residuals of the global model. 
Values were between −0.4 and 0.3 for all distances up to 5,000 km, 
and showed no overall trend, suggesting no significant spatial autocor-
relation. Spatial autoregressive models were therefore not used.
TABLE  1 Best models (∆I < 6) predicting DAISIE 100 scores in Eurasian countries
Model rank Intercept Gov:GDP Governance GDP Area Insularity PopDen Road density Continentality Precipitation Temperature K Log- likelihood AICc ∆i Adj. R
2
1 10.67 ± 1.21 4.98 ± 2.83 4.87 ± 4.49 2.94 ± 0.79 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 4 −101.20 214.3 0 0.667
2 11.11 ± 1.35 4.99 ± 2.79 5.71 ± 4.59 2.72 ± 0.84 NA + NA NA NA NA NA 5 −100.07 214.9 0.59 0.677
3 10.69 ± 1.21 4.43 ± 3.04 4.60 ± 4.52 2.89 ± 0.80 NA NA 0.60 ± 1.20 NA NA NA NA 5 −100.61 215.9 1.67 0.668
4 11.17 ± 1.35 4.34 ± 2.98 5.48 ± 4.58 2.63 ± 0.85 NA + 0.70 ± 1.18 NA NA NA NA 6 −99.23 216.2 1.92 0.681
5 10.68 ± 1.22 4.71 ± 2.92 3.80 ± 5.17 3.35 ± 1.24 −0.49 ± 1.15 NA NA NA NA NA NA 5 −100.77 216.3 1.99 0.665
6 11.13 ± 1.36 4.70 ± 2.87 4.59 ± 5.21 3.15 ± 1.26 −0.52 ± 1.13 + NA NA NA NA NA 6 −99.56 216.9 2.59 0.676
7 11.44 ± 1.40 NA 10.44 ± 4.84 NA 2.78 ± 0.93 + 3.98 ± 1.35 NA NA NA NA 5 −101.75 218.2 3.95 0.647
8 11.27 ± 1.37 3.66 ± 3.42 8.73 ± 9.07 0.95 ± 4.14 1.79 ± 4.30 + 2.51 ± 4.52 NA NA NA NA 7 −98.79 218.5 4.28 0.679
9 10.70 ± 1.23 4.11 ± 3.47 6.10 ± 8.76 2.10 ± 4.02 0.86 ± 4.27 NA 1.46 ± 4.46 NA NA NA NA 6 −100.51 218.8 4.49 0.659
10 10.84 ± 1.29 NA 9.88 ± 4.98 NA 3.07 ± 0.90 NA 4.15 ± 1.49 NA NA NA NA 5 −103.68 219.2 4.97 0.621
Models ranked by increasing AICc. Coefficient estimates and 95% CI shown. Gov:GDP, Governance- GDP interaction; PopDen, Population Density;  
K, Number of fitted parameters (including intercept and residual variance); ∆I, Difference between AICc value of the best model and other models;  
Adj. R2, Coefficient of determination, adjusted for the number of parameters.
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3  | RESULTS
3.1 | Overall governance score
Model selection showed that no single model was overwhelmingly 
supported by the data (∆i < 6, Table 1). GDP, Governance, and their in-
teraction appeared in the best model, as well as eight of the 10 models 
with ∆i < 6 (Table 1). The estimated coefficients of these three terms 
were positive, and their 95% confidence intervals did not overlap 
zero in seven of 10 models with ∆i < 6 (Table 1). R
2 values were con-
sistently high across all top models (Table 1), suggesting parameters 
within this set explained much of the variance in DAISIE 100 scores. 
Area, Population Density, and Insularity did not consistently appear in 
the top models (Table 1).
Using hierarchical cluster analysis, four categories of country or-
dered by increasing wealth as measured by GDP were identified. 
These categories are as follows: Lower (L; US$11–145bn), Middle 
(M; US$186–416bn), Upper- Middle (UM; US$690–793bn), and Upper 
(U; US$1.8–3.2trn).
These groupings were used to plot Figure 2. The interaction be-
tween Governance and GDP was a significant determinant of variation 
in DAISIE 100 scores (Figure 2), appearing in eight of the 10 best mod-
els (∆i < 6, Table 1). Surprisingly, the relationship between DAISIE 100 
scores and governance was positive for Eurasian countries with higher 
GDP, suggesting that, ceteris paribus, increases in governance associ-
ated with more severe invasions. Contrastingly, for low-GDP Eurasian 
countries (L group nations), better governance might do the opposite, 
as it associated with reduced DAISIE 100 scores (Figure 2).
3.2 | Separate governance indicators
In order to examine whether any specific aspect of governance as-
sociated with IAS, the analysis was repeated replacing overall gov-
ernance scores with each of the six indicators (Table 2). Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability, Regulatory Quality, and Rule of 
Law returned similar results to the original regression that used an 
overall governance score, with the interaction term appearing in the 
top models (Tables 2 and S2–S5). Government Effectiveness and 
Control of Corruption also appeared in their most parsimonious 
models but were not as strong predictors, as they were not included 
in as many of the top models (Tables S6 and S7). Based on the AIC 
of the best model, Political Stability and Voice and Accountability 
were the best predictors of the distribution of IAS, of the six aspects 
of governance (Table 2).
As a robustness test to confirm the validity of using GDP instead 
of Merchandise Imports as a proxy for trade, the model was rerun with 
Merchandise Imports as an explanatory variable. This also showed that 
Governance and the interaction term appeared in the best model, sug-
gesting that using GDP instead of Merchandise Imports did not affect 
the findings (Table S8).
4  | DISCUSSION
Whilst many studies have considered the socioeconomic factors influ-
encing the distribution of IAS (Essl et al., 2011; McGeoch et al., 2010; 
Pyšek et al., 2010; Westphal et al., 2008), our study explores this re-
lationship between governance and IAS distribution in greater detail. 
The result of our study clearly shows the importance of countries’ 
governance as well as GDP in explaining invasive species distributions.
Our finding that stronger governance is associated with the intro-
duction of IAS in Eurasian countries with higher GDP stands in sharp 
contrast with much of the governance- biodiversity literature, which 
typically regards poor governance as a threat to biodiversity (Smith, 
Muir, et al., 2003; Smith, Obidzinski, et al., 2003). An intuitive explana-
tion as to why our results for Eurasian nations with higher GDP contrast 
with this body of literature is that governance was a further indirect 
proxy of propagule pressure—a measure of the number and frequency 
of individuals released into an area to which they are not indigenous 
(Lockwood, Cassey, & Blackburn, 2005). Propagule pressure is a key 
determinant of invasion success, being the most important factor de-
termining exotic bird species richness across Europe (Chiron, Shirley, 
TABLE  1 Best models (∆I < 6) predicting DAISIE 100 scores in Eurasian countries
Model rank Intercept Gov:GDP Governance GDP Area Insularity PopDen Road density Continentality Precipitation Temperature K Log- likelihood AICc ∆i Adj. R
2
1 10.67 ± 1.21 4.98 ± 2.83 4.87 ± 4.49 2.94 ± 0.79 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 4 −101.20 214.3 0 0.667
2 11.11 ± 1.35 4.99 ± 2.79 5.71 ± 4.59 2.72 ± 0.84 NA + NA NA NA NA NA 5 −100.07 214.9 0.59 0.677
3 10.69 ± 1.21 4.43 ± 3.04 4.60 ± 4.52 2.89 ± 0.80 NA NA 0.60 ± 1.20 NA NA NA NA 5 −100.61 215.9 1.67 0.668
4 11.17 ± 1.35 4.34 ± 2.98 5.48 ± 4.58 2.63 ± 0.85 NA + 0.70 ± 1.18 NA NA NA NA 6 −99.23 216.2 1.92 0.681
5 10.68 ± 1.22 4.71 ± 2.92 3.80 ± 5.17 3.35 ± 1.24 −0.49 ± 1.15 NA NA NA NA NA NA 5 −100.77 216.3 1.99 0.665
6 11.13 ± 1.36 4.70 ± 2.87 4.59 ± 5.21 3.15 ± 1.26 −0.52 ± 1.13 + NA NA NA NA NA 6 −99.56 216.9 2.59 0.676
7 11.44 ± 1.40 NA 10.44 ± 4.84 NA 2.78 ± 0.93 + 3.98 ± 1.35 NA NA NA NA 5 −101.75 218.2 3.95 0.647
8 11.27 ± 1.37 3.66 ± 3.42 8.73 ± 9.07 0.95 ± 4.14 1.79 ± 4.30 + 2.51 ± 4.52 NA NA NA NA 7 −98.79 218.5 4.28 0.679
9 10.70 ± 1.23 4.11 ± 3.47 6.10 ± 8.76 2.10 ± 4.02 0.86 ± 4.27 NA 1.46 ± 4.46 NA NA NA NA 6 −100.51 218.8 4.49 0.659
10 10.84 ± 1.29 NA 9.88 ± 4.98 NA 3.07 ± 0.90 NA 4.15 ± 1.49 NA NA NA NA 5 −103.68 219.2 4.97 0.621
Models ranked by increasing AICc. Coefficient estimates and 95% CI shown. Gov:GDP, Governance- GDP interaction; PopDen, Population Density;  
K, Number of fitted parameters (including intercept and residual variance); ∆I, Difference between AICc value of the best model and other models;  
Adj. R2, Coefficient of determination, adjusted for the number of parameters.
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& Kark, 2009) and exotic avian establishment success across 41 is-
land systems worldwide (Cassey, Blackburn, Duncan, & Gaston, 2005). 
Governance might increase propagule pressure through its beneficial 
effects on trade. A country’s trade increases when the quality of legal 
and economic institutions is strengthened (Anderson & Marcouiller, 
2002). In turn, increased trade boosts the rate at which propagules 
are introduced, causing more biological invasions (Westphal et al., 
2008). Nevertheless, as trade was included in the model, either di-
rectly or through the representation of GDP (see Methods), an effect 
on the volume of trade cannot alone have resulted with the effect of 
 governance found in our models.
In accordance with our findings, there are many examples of gov-
ernance facilitating trade to the detriment of controlling IAS. World 
Trade Organization agreements help tackle corruption and foster 
stronger governance, thus improving international trade (Aaronson 
& Abouharb, 2013); but agreements generally lack the mechanisms 
to internalize the externalities of IAS spread through trade (Perrings, 
Dehnen- Schmutz, Touza, & Williamson, 2005). Likewise, EU trade 
agreements are upheld at the expense of controlling IAS: in 1989, 
Germany banned the import of live European freshwater crayfish in 
order to halt the spread of invasive crayfish plague (Aphanomyces 
astaci [Schikora 1906]), but the European Commission successfully 
argued that this law amounted to a “disguised restriction upon trade” 
within the EU and was thus not permissible (Commission of the 
European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, 1994). In such 
ways, strong governance and trade can interact to facilitate the spread 
of IAS within Eurasian countries with higher GDP.
Human movement unrelated to trade also spread IAS. For exam-
ple, the worldwide airline transportation network has allowed inter-
connections between geographically disparate but climatically similar 
regions, facilitating biological invasions (Tatem & Hay, 2007). Although 
Road Density failed to appear in the set of top models, other stud-
ies suggest road networks contribute to the spread of IAS (Vilà & 
Pujadas, 2001). Poor governance might reduce travel to that coun-
try, potentially explaining why better governance associated with 
increased DAISIE 100 scores in certain countries. Political instability, 
human rights violations, conflict, and terrorism can harm a nation’s 
tourism industry (Neumayer, 2004). In contrast, Europe’s Schengen 
Treaty—which guarantees free human movement between signatory 
countries—might be facilitating the spread of IAS (Cobo, Vieira- Lanero, 
Rego, & Servia, 2010), but its existence depends upon strong gover-
nance in member nations.
Our analysis investigated a type of governance that has been termed 
“conventional governance” (Ceddia et al., 2014). However, there is a 
growing appreciation of an alternative form of governance—environ-
mental governance, defined as, “the rules, practices, policies, and insti-
tutions that shape how humans interact with the environment” (UNEP 
2010). A study modeling the role of governance in determining pat-
terns of land use change under agricultural intensification in six South 
American countries in 1970–2006 found that these two forms of gov-
ernance led to alternative outcomes for biodiversity: Higher conven-
tional governance scores led to spatial expansion of agricultural land, 
whereas higher environmental governance scores (as measured by the 
Environmental Performance Index [EPI] and the area of protected land) 
were associated with land- sparing forms of agricultural intensification 
(Ceddia et al., 2014). Strong conventional governance did not equate 
to strong environmental governance, because the former reflects the 
“conditions necessary for the establishment of operational markets, 
rather than environmental protection per se” (Ceddia et al., 2014).
The differentiation between conventional and environmental gov-
ernance offers a novel perspective on previous studies associating high 
corruption with poor environmental performance (Peh & Drori, 2010; 
Smith, Muir, et al., 2003; Smith, Obidzinski, et al., 2003; Umemiya 
et al., 2010) and instead suggests that strong conventional governance 
can go hand in hand with environmental degradation. Our findings 
resonate with this standpoint: Strong governance could lead to more 
IAS through its ability to improve the efficiency with which a nation 
introduces IAS. Conversely, strong governance does not necessarily 
mean that existing legislation for tackling IAS has always been effec-
tive. For example, the 1951 International Plant Protection Convention 
has evidently been ineffectual at slowing the spread of pests, and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) requires parties to take ac-
tions against IAS, but countries are not sanctioned for failing to com-
ply with these directives (Keller, Geist, Jeschke, & Kühn, 2011). In the 
case of the EU, while the CBD’s Article on IAS was adopted into an 
EU Strategy for Biodiversity (European Commission 2011), EU legis-
lation targeting IAS only came into effect in January 2015 (Genovesi, 
Carboneras, Vilà, & Walton, 2014). Furthermore, only 55% of coun-
tries that are signatory to the CBD have national legislation relevant to 
IAS (McGeoch et al., 2010). Even where national IAS policies such as 
black lists are established, their heterogeneity across countries under-
mines its effectiveness (García- de- Lomas & Vilà, 2015).
Environmental governance was not part of this analysis, as the EPI 
only began in 2000 (Hsu et al., 2014), which, because of invasion debt 
(see Methods), is not a sufficiently long period of time to confidently 
assess the impact of EPI on invasions. However, for the countries 
under analysis, 2013 EPI scores weakly correlated with 2013 WGI 
estimates (rs = .363, n = 38, p = .025), further supporting the finding 
by Ceddia et al. (2014) that strong conventional governance does not 
equal strong environmental governance. Future analyses would bene-
fit by exploring the environmental dimensions of governance, and we 
expect that, within GDP groups, countries with better environmental 
governance will show reduced DAISIE 100 scores.
While the explanations discussed so far address the positive asso-
ciation between governance and DAISIE 100 scores in the majority of 
Eurasian countries studied (U/UM/M group countries), for countries 
with the lowest GDP included in the analysis (L group countries), our 
model indicated a negative relationship, whereby better governance 
associated with reduced DAISIE 100 scores (Figure 2). We suggest 
that this relationship might be the result of a balance between GDP 
(which correlates with trade and thus increases propagule pressure) 
and governance (which, if effective, might decrease propagule pres-
sure through proper control and regulation of vectors and pathways of 
introduction). Countries with lower GDP likely have less international 
trade, which in turn reduces their rate of IAS introduction. This low 
level of propagule pressure might mean strong governance is capable 
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of stemming the flow of incoming IAS. Strengthening governance may 
therefore lead to differential outcomes in countries with high or low 
GDP: in countries with lower GDP, stronger governance might be as-
sociated with a reduced environmental footprint, whereas in coun-
tries with higher GDP, stronger governance might be associated with 
greater opportunities to exploit the environment more efficiently. This 
theory, however, needs to be empirically tested.
Many conservationists assume strengthening governance will as-
sist conservation interventions (Peh, 2013; Smith & Walpole, 2005). 
Our own results partially support this claim—governance policies in 
many Eurasian countries of smaller economy appear to have the ben-
eficial effect of reducing the spread of IAS. This hints toward a key gap 
in current approaches to conservation policy. For example, the recent 
adoption of EU Regulation 1143/2014 on IAS aims to generate a co-
ordinated response to high- risk IAS. Such siloed approach is therefore 
insufficient to attain the highest possible environmental outcomes, 
and our findings reinforce the call to tackle IAS broadly on multiple 
fronts, including both socioeconomic, governance, and environmental 
policy.
F IGURE  2 Effect of governance on DAISIE 100 scores was 
mediated by a country’s GDP. Low- GDP countries (L) showed 
decreasing scores with increasing governance, as illustrated by the 
dashed line (- - - ) which represents the model output for the lowest 
GDP country. In contrast, richer countries (U/UM/M) suffered 
from increasing scores with better governance, as illustrated by 
the unbroken line (—) which represents the model output for the 
highest GDP country. Governance scores were centered to mean. 
Regression lines were drawn from parameter estimates in the best 
model (∆I = 0, Table 1); M/UM lines used the categories’ median GDP 
value. Country abbreviations are ISO two- letter codes: AL (Albania); 
AT (Austria); BE (Belgium); BG (Bulgaria); BY (Belarus); CY (Cyprus); 
Czech Republic (CZ); DE (Germany); DK (Denmark); EE (Estonia); ES 
(Spain); FI (Finland); FR (France); GB (United Kingdom); GR (Greece); 
HR (Croatia); HU (Hungary); IE (Ireland); IL (Israel); IS (Iceland); IT 
(Italy); LT (Lithuania); LU (Luxembourg); LV (Latvia); MD (Moldova); 
MT (Malta); NL (the Netherlands); NO (Norway); PL (Poland); PT 
(Portugal); RO (Romania); RS (Serbia); RU (Russia); SE (Sweden); SK 
(Slovakia); SI (Slovenia); TR (Turkey); UA (Ukraine)
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A related policy implication is that high- GDP countries with rela-
tively stronger governance are expected to be more vulnerable to the 
introduction of new IAS. To overcome this enhanced susceptibility to 
novel IAS, high- GDP countries with strong governance should devote 
greater resources to preventing their introduction.
Our findings suggest that the notion of strong governance as an 
ally to conservation might mask the true complexity of the relation-
ship between governance and biodiversity loss (Katzner, 2005); fa-
vorable conservation outcomes are not always associated with good 
governance. Whilst current conservation activities have paid attention 
to drivers of IAS such as trade and human movement, the under- 
researched relationship between governance and biodiversity means 
little action has been taken to address the impact of governance on 
the spread of IAS. Resolving the interactions between governance and 
biodiversity will reveal a greater understanding of the socioeconomic 
drivers of biodiversity loss, allowing future interventions to tackle this 
underappreciated aspect of conservation.
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